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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	v.	19 Cr. 870 (JMF)
5	MUSTAPHA RAJI,	
6	Defendant.	Sentence
7	x	
8	Δ	New York, N.Y.
9		September 19, 2023 2:30 p.m.
10		2.00 p.m.
11	Before:	
12	HON. JESSE M. FURMAN,	
13		District Judge
14	APPEARANCES	
15	DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the	
16	Southern District of New York JILAN KAMAL CATHERINE E. GHOSH ROBERT SOBELMAN Assistant United States Attorneys	
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19	ROTHMAN, SCHNEIDER, SOLOWAY & STERN, LLP Attorneys for Defendant	
20	BY: JEREMY SCHNEIDER RACHEL PERILLO	
21		
22	Also Present:	
23	Michael Ryan, FBI	
24		
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	II	

(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your name for the record.

MS. KAMAL: Good afternoon, your Honor.

Jilan Kamal, Catherine Ghosh, and Rob Sobelman, on behalf of the United States. And with us is Agent Ryan from the FBI.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Good afternoon, your Honor.

Jeremy Schneider and Rachel Perillo, appearing for Mr. Raji. Good afternoon, sir.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Welcome back, everyone.

We are finally here for purposes of sentencing. I realized earlier today that it was literally a year to the day that the verdict was returned in this case, so not exactly speedy, but here we are.

In connection with today's proceeding, I have reviewed the presentence report, dated April 24, 2023. I've also received and reviewed the following additional submissions:

The defense submissions dated May 2 and September 13, as well as the attachments to those submissions, which include various letters addressed to me, including letters from Mr. Raji's sister and cousin, some charities, and other family members and the like; a birth certificate; some medical records and certificates from the Bureau of Prisons; and the government

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submissions dated May 9, May 15, and June 13 of this year.

First, have each of you received the other's submissions? I guess most notably, has the government received all of the defense submissions including the exhibits that were filed with the request that they be sealed?

MS. KAMAL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And is there anything else that I should have received, aside from what I just listed?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Your Honor, I think the government submitted a letter on September 15.

THE COURT: Sorry. You're absolutely right.

MR. SCHNEIDER: I have seen that letter.

THE COURT: As did I. I apologize. I just omitted it from the list. So I have also gotten that.

Anything aside from those?

MS. KAMAL: Not from the government, your Honor.

MR. SCHNEIDER: No, we're good, Judge. Thank you.

THE COURT: I have reviewed the defense exhibits and agree that the medical exhibits and birth certificate should be filed under seal also. I will file those under seal. In the event of an appeal, they may be accessed by counsel on appeal without further application to me, but otherwise will remain under seal.

Can I confirm with the government that anyone entitled to notice as a crime victim has been provided with notice of

today's proceeding?

MS. KAMAL: Yes, your Honor. The victims are aware of the proceedings.

THE COURT: Do you know if anyone wishes to be heard on that score?

MS. KAMAL: No, your Honor. The victims all participated in the trial, and they told me they would rest on their representations and their testimony here.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

Before I turn to sentencing, Mr. Schneider, I just wanted to give you an opportunity to be heard with respect to the government's letter of June 13, which noted that the government had determined that there was an error in the jury instructions, and expressed its view as to why that error didn't have any legal significance here.

Did you wish to be heard on that?

MR. SCHNEIDER: I don't wish to be heard as to the substance, but I think at the end of the sentence I will probably ask to be relieved for the appeal. Generally, because I think after trial it's good to have a fresh set of eyes, but, specifically, because of that letter, it's obviously a mistake that I made with the government regarding the instructions. I think maybe there are other mistakes that I may have made that the government didn't agree with or the government didn't make your Honor aware of. So in terms of the substance of the

June 13 letter, I have nothing to add to that, no.

THE COURT: All right. Very good. Understood.

And I guess we'll take that up at the conclusion. For what it's worth, I agree with the government that the error — and it does seem that it was an error — doesn't have effect here, both because of the invited—error doctrine, but substantively it also seems inconceivable to me that that error could have any prejudice to Mr. Raji, since there was really ample evidence of his own participation in the fraud scheme. And, indeed, it would be hard to reconcile the jury's conviction on the substantive count without that evidence, so bottom line is I don't think it had any impact. But obviously if it's raised on appeal, it will be up to the Court of Appeals to determine.

Now, Mr. Schneider, have you reviewed the presentence report?

MR. SCHNEIDER: I have, with Mr. Raji, yes.

THE COURT: And putting aside the guidelines for a moment, I know you have some objections on that score. Any objections or corrections to the factual recitation set forth in the presentence report? And I recognize you're preserving your objection to the factual description of the offense. I think it accurately describes the record at trial, but I think you're preserving the appellate issues on that score.

MR. SCHNEIDER: You said just what I was going to say,

so I have nothing to add to that, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Raji, have you reviewed the presentence report?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: All right. And did you discuss it with Mr. Schneider?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: And did you have enough time to do that, to go over the report with Mr. Schneider and to discuss with him anything that you wish to bring to my attention in connection with sentencing?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: Ms. Kamal, have you reviewed the presentence report?

MS. KAMAL: Yes, I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: Putting aside the guidelines for a moment, any objections to its factual accuracy?

MS. KAMAL: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Hearing no objections, aside from the preservation of Mr. Raji's appellate rights, I will adopt the factual recitation set forth in the presentence report, which will be made part of the record in this matter and placed under seal. In the event that an appeal is taken, counsel on appeal may have access to that sealed report without further application to me.

Now, turning to the guidelines, as counsel know, I'm not bound by the guidelines, but I do have to consider the applicable guidelines range in imposing a sentence, and that requires me to accurately calculate that range. In this case, the presentence report calculates the offense level as 33, the criminal history category as I, and the corresponding guidelines range is 135 to 168 months, with a supervised release range of one to three years, and a fine range of 35 to \$350,000.

And defendant has lodged three objections. I think two are relatively easily resolved because the defense concedes that they run contrary to the law of this circuit. First is to the inclusion of relevant conduct and the loss amount, as the defendant concedes that it runs contrary, not just to the language of Section 1B1.3, but to the decisions of the Second Circuit, including United States v. Feldman, which is cited on page 3 of the defendant's sentencing submission.

And so, too, on the distinction between intended loss and actual loss, as counsel acknowledges, runs contrary to the law of the circuit, see page 5 of the defense brief, *United States v. Lacey*. The Third Circuit decision is interesting, the question is interesting in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Kisor*, but the bottom line is I'm bound by the Second Circuit, and unless intervening decision of the Supreme Court renders that prior precedent so clearly wrong that it

would inevitably be overruled by the Second Circuit, I can't say that here, if only because the Second Circuit has reaffirmed the principle since *Kisor*, namely in *United States* v. Powell, which is cited by the government in its most recent submission.

I would also cite to Judge Liman's decision in a case called Taboada v. United States, 2023 WL 2466595, in which he approved the inclusion of intended loss in the loss calculation and found that there was ambiguity that was clarified by the application note. I'm not saying that's right or wrong, but bottom line is I don't think the prior Second Circuit case law is clearly wrong in light of Kisor, or given that it's up to the Second Circuit to reevaluate its precedent, not up to me. So bottom line is on both of those, I think I am bound to reject the defense arguments and, therefore, do reject the defense arguments.

The third issue, I think, is a closer call, and that is whether a leadership enhancement is warranted, and I guess I'll pose this question to the government. There's no question in my mind that Mr. Raji played a more significant role than Ms. Martino-Jean, and that is relevant to the 3553 analysis, and I'll have more to say on that later. He clearly gave her some instructions and directions with respect to moving the money out of the account and what have you, but I'm not sure that that necessarily makes him an organizer, leader, or

manager of the conduct.

You stated in your letter several times that Mr. Raji recruited Ms. Martino-Jean to the scheme, and I don't recall -- maybe there is evidence in the record to support that. Is there support for that proposition as opposed to the text exchanges in which Mr. Raji certainly is giving some directions? But I'm not sure that that necessarily supports the weight of the argument that you're making.

MS. KAMAL: May I have one moment, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.

MS. KAMAL: So your Honor, in terms of the evidence that was put forward at trial, the Court is correct that for our position we were relying on the text messages between Mr. Raji and Ms. Martino-Jean in which he is telling her when to expect money movements, telling her what to do with them, and basically he is the one who is in contact with the -- let's call them the ultimate principals of the scheme. The only appropriate inference here is that he is the one who has brought her into the scheme, otherwise how would she know and how would she have become involved, if not at his direction?

The other evidence before the Court and at trial was that the cooperator, Mr. Afolabi Adeusi, he explained that Mr. Raji's role in these schemes, as he understood it, was effectively as a broker of accounts. As we saw from the 404(b) evidence, Mr. Raji occasionally used his own accounts, but he

was also reaching out to others and bringing in others who had accounts that could accept large amounts and move the money quickly. Ms. Martino-Jean was just that, she both worked for a law firm and she was a real estate agent. And in connection with her other work, she had access to the type of accounts that would be moving and accepting large quantities of money, which is exactly what Mr. Raji was tasked with procuring for the scheme.

So from our point of view, that is what supports the inference here that he recruited her to the scheme, and he was the one who was giving her direction.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schneider, do you wish to be heard?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes. May I remain seated just so I can read, Judge?

THE COURT: As long as you put the microphone down so I can hear you.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Absolutely. Is that okay?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Thank you, your Honor. Appreciate it.

Well, let's remember that Ms. Martino-Jean has already pled guilty, and let's remember that in the government's own sentencing submissions they painted her as someone who didn't just make one mistake but acted in a calculated period of time committing a course of crimes. Let's also remember that she

was the one who got significantly more money than Mr. Raji. She was the one who distributed large portions of the proceeds to persons and entities with whom she was associated, including \$700,000 of the fraud proceeds she used to pay off personal debts where, according to the trial evidence, Mr. Raji only received \$50,000 of the proceeds.

How can the person who was supposedly the leader in charge, the recruiter, get a fraction of what the person who was -- Ms. Martino-Jean, who supposedly did nothing? Remember, again, she was the president of a company. She had signatory powers, she had a debit card; Mr. Raji didn't. Mr. Raji didn't have access to the accounts; Ms. Martino-Jean did. So it seems to me that it's possible not only should Mr. Raji not get a leadership, but the more I talk about it, I'm convincing myself he should get a minor role.

THE COURT: I wouldn't push your luck.

MR. SCHNEIDER: That's why I'm not talking about that. I understand.

I think it's a significant question, and I think the government's answer that you can assume she was recruited is speculation. Your Honor is right, the trial evidence did not show that Mr. Raji recruited her. And even if he did "recruit," put that in quotes, so let's say he brought her on to help, but she then took a greater role. She's the one who had much more decision-making authority. She's the one who got

more money. She's the one who gave the money, distributed it. So it seems to me that he should not get an enhancement.

THE COURT: Ms. Kamal?

MS. KAMAL: If I may be heard very briefly on that point.

THE COURT: Sure. But in the course of that — I was planning to ask you about this later, but may as well ask you about it now — I think Mr. Schneider's point about

Ms. Martino-Jean getting the vast majority of the proceeds that were not recovered is an interesting, if not significant, one.

One generally doesn't think of the manager as getting the small slice and the worker getting the vast majority of the profits, but at least on the trial record that seems to be the case here.

MS. KAMAL: I take your point, your Honor. But I think there's another concept that we're all familiar with that does a lot of the explanatory work here, and that is there is no honor among thieves.

To be sure, Ms. Martino-Jean took the vast majority of the sum, but that was not the instruction she was given by Mr. Raji. Mr. Raji was clearly horrified when he had to report to the folks up the chain that the money they were waiting for was apparently missing and that she had stopped communicating with him. And so what we see in the text messages and what was reflected in the evidence at trial is that Ms. Martino-Jean

effectively went rogue.

She clearly took direction from Mr. Raji with respect to what to do with the money, how it was to be disbursed and to whom. She was, as we can, we think, properly infer from that evidence, recruited to the scheme by him. But then at some point she saw the opportunity in front of her, and she took the lion's share for herself and attempted to effectively stonewall and run away with the funds.

So while I take the Court's point and defense's point that she ultimately wound up with more of the proceeds, that was not intended, and that did not make her somehow have a greater role in the scheme than Mr. Raji.

THE COURT: All right. I think it's a close question. And I suspect that for appellate purposes, I could probably infer in either direction, but I'm not going to apply the enhancement. My speculation is that Mr. Raji was indeed superior to Ms. Martino-Jean and directed her, if not recruited her, but I don't think the evidence clearly supports that. I don't think that inference is a necessary or mandatory one, and I think it's undercut by evidence that she took the vast majority of the criminal proceeds here.

Bottom line is, given his role, that he was sort of the middleman broker. His role was to find the accounts and essentially direct deposits and withdrawals from those accounts. I think the text messages are as consistent with

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just him performing that role and doesn't necessarily mean that he was giving direction, let alone exercising the kind of discretion that characterizes a manager or supervisor.

So bottom line is I think the record is not substantial enough to draw the inference that the government is urging. I will not impose an enhancement for a leadership That reduces the guidelines calculation by two. I assume the government would concede, in light of that, that in the event a zero-point offender amendment goes into effect, that Mr. Raji would benefit from that as well; is that correct? MS. KAMAL: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So as I have in other cases,

and I assume without objection from the government since it has taken that position in other cases, I will essentially treat that amendment as if it was in effect today.

So as a technical legal matter, I find, using the November 2021 edition of the guidelines which is still in effect, that the offense level is 31, the criminal history category is I, and the guidelines range is 108 to 135 months' imprisonment, with a supervised release range of one to three years, and a fine range of 30,000 to \$300,000. But as an effective matter, I will treat the guidelines range and the offense level as 29, and the corresponding guidelines range is 87 to 108 months.

Turning to departures, obviously there are 3553

variances, but do either counsel believe that a departure within the guideline system as distinct from what has come to be known as a variance would be warranted here?

MS. KAMAL: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Schneider?

MR. SCHNEIDER: No departures, your Honor.

THE COURT: I've nevertheless reviewed the record and agree that there is no basis or ground for a departure, again, as distinct from a variance.

With that, I'll turn first to the government and then to Mr. Schneider and then to Mr. Raji, if he wishes to be heard as to sentencing. Obviously I did preside over the trial. It obviously was also a long time ago. I've also read your lengthy sentencing submissions and you can assume that I'm already familiar with what you are arguing there. So you don't need to repeat anything you've already argued, but anything that you think would be helpful to me, you certainly can address.

I'll start with the government, and in the course of whatever you have to say, I would like you to spend a little more time on the relationship with Martino-Jean, not necessarily on factually their relationship, but it seems a little bit hard to sort of square a 78-month sentence, which is what you're asking, with the six-month sentence that was imposed on her, recognizing, I'm inclined to agree, that

Mr. Raji is the more culpable of the two. Obviously his criminal conduct here extended beyond the \$1.7 million Marble Arch transaction. And there were the two similar schemes that were presented at trial; there was the attempt, if you will, after Ms. Martino-Jean. So I fully recognize and plan to take into consideration those things, but even so, six months versus what you're asking for seems like a pretty heavy distinction.

So Ms. Kamal?

MS. KAMAL: So your Honor, you've actually previewed everything I was about to tell you.

So I guess where I will start, your Honor, here, is relevant conduct. Ms. Martino-Jean is not alleged to have participated in the other schemes that were presented to the jury at trial. And as the Court is well aware, Mr. Raji orchestrated and received the vast amount of the proceeds from two other similar such phishing schemes that targeted a hospital system and a public university.

Not only did the nature of the victims here warrant a more severe punishment, but the pattern, your Honor, just simply illustrates that this instance, the Marble Arch scheme, was not a one-off. It was not an act of desperation. This is, in fact, how Mr. Raji has supported himself for years. And we think of the text messages that were introduced at trial, in particular the text messages with the cooperating witness, Mr. Adeusi, who reached out to the defendant after the Marble

Arch scheme had been uncovered and after the defendant was well aware that this was obviously a fraudulent scheme, if he could have even plausibly claimed that it wasn't before, and he clearly wanted back in. He was going to do it again.

Your Honor, there was no such evidence against Nancy Martino-Jean, and, accordingly, the guidelines for Mr. Raji include that relevant conduct which increased the loss amounts from 1.9 million up to 3.9 million. And so we think that is a substantial consideration for the Court, and it warrants a substantial sentence.

The second thing I would note is that Ms. Martino-Jean also accepted responsibility. She accepted responsibility early and quickly, and that not only spared the government resources, but it also reflects on the fact that this was not, in fact, Ms. Martino-Jean's livelihood. As I mentioned to the Court, the government was aware at the time Ms. Martino-Jean was charged and from the evidence that was seized in the course of the investigation that she, in fact, did have other gainful employment, legitimate employment.

Notwithstanding the nonprofits and the development work that Mr. Raji points to, his purported development work and the entities through which he purports to have done it have never filed taxes, and the government was able to determine no legitimate work ever done by him, at least in this country.

And so for that reason, your Honor, we think there's a stark

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distinction in the 3553(a) factors between these two defendants.

Last but not least, your Honor, the government has tried to be very reasonable in its consideration of what would be an appropriate sentence for Mr. Raji. So the government has not simply come in here and unthinkingly requested a guideline The guidelines range here is very high. government and the defendant went to trial. The government nevertheless sat down, took seriously the factors such as the defendant's health and the support from his family and his other factors, and we have concluded, based on our investigation and the evidence that was put before the jury, that this is the reasonable sentence for a defendant who, notwithstanding his other excellent qualities, I'm sure, as a person, has nevertheless engaged in these types of serial frauds for years and that have bilked victims of millions of dollars. And so we really think that a substantial sentence here is warranted, notwithstanding the lesser sentence that Ms. Martino-Jean received.

THE COURT: And could I actually ask you to elaborate on one thing you touched upon, which is, in your sentencing submission there's a footnote that I would say casts some doubt on the defendant's claims or representations with respect to his work history. Can you just elaborate on that? You touched briefly on it a moment ago, but other than the fact that he

didn't file any taxes — and that's not an insignificant fact — can you tell me what ground you have, if any, to doubt that he has that work history or history of charitable involvement?

MS. KAMAL: Can I have one moment, your Honor?

So your Honor, by pointing to the evidence of the lack of any tax records here, what the government is really pointing to, and what I can provide a little more color on, is the fact that these entities were effectively shell entities. The government was unable to identify any operations, any donations, any employees, any legitimate activities that were undertaken by the two Emergent entities that Mr. Raji cites in his submission. And so, as far as the government can tell, Mr. Raji had no other source of employment and engaged in no other activity other than these particular schemes.

THE COURT: And correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the two other fraud schemes proved at trial did involve transfers to the Emergent entity; is that correct?

MS. KAMAL: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And a final question just as a housekeeping matter, your submission indicated that you were trying to reach agreement on forfeiture and restitution. I think I then got proposed orders on both and with electronic signatures from Mr. Schneider and Mr. Raji. Is it your understanding — I'll confirm with Mr. Schneider — that that is agreed upon?

MS. KAMAL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Schneider, first, just to get that out of the way, is that correct? Can I sign the proposed orders of forfeiture and restitution and did you sign them and did your client sign them?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes, your Honor. Yes, I was about to mention that in a few minutes. So the answer is yes. I've discussed with Mr. Raji the restitution order or the proposed restitution order, and he authorized me to sign it on his behalf.

THE COURT: All right. And as to sentencing, you may proceed.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Thank you, your Honor.

You know, as a lawyer, it's kind of difficult to talk about acceptance of responsibility after trial on behalf of a client because, as your Honor knows full well, there's going to be an appeal, and so therefore it would not be wise for me to advise him to make a statement. But be that as it may, and we said it in our written submission and I'll say it again, Mr. Raji has accepted the jury verdict. We can disagree with it, but he has accepted it. He made no attempts to either intimidate witnesses either during trial or after trial regarding sentences. He didn't testify in any manner that would indicate that he was trying to obstruct justice.

And I'm not going to go into the details again, but

his medical condition is something that can't be ignored and, in fact, has worsened over time since he's been in. He went from stage 3 to stage 4 chronic kidney, heart issues, etc.

That's all been documented in our submission. I'll not go into the details about that again.

Now, in an attempt to kind of mitigate that, the government has filed a letter indicating that the BOP says, "No problem, we can handle it. We have medical facilities. We have different units within different facilities. We can handle it." But I guess my question to your Honor is what else are they going to say? Are they going to say, "We can't handle -- " and the fact is your Honor has been doing this a long time. I have. They've never said they couldn't handle a situation. But we all know that what they say and what they're actually capable of doing in terms of this serious medical situation is not entirely accurate.

We all have anecdotal evidence about people not getting the treatment that they need. In fact, one of the reasons your Honor let Mr. Raji out on bail after he'd been in for a number of months was during COVID and the harsh conditions and the fact he wasn't receiving appropriate medical care. And your Honor let him out, and how did Mr. Raji respond? He responded by not getting into any trouble at all. So in terms of his medical conditions, that's a real problem. He was on home incarceration for about seven months. He's now

been in custody for about 20 months in MDC, which as we all know, is under extreme harsh conditions, not just with COVID, but with the lockdowns and all the problems MDC is having, and as your Honor knows and has in the past given consideration to those harsh conditions at the time of some sentences.

Your Honor asked the government about

Ms. Martino-Jean's sentence of time served. Well, okay, they
drew a distinction, but let's remember her guidelines were 33
to 41, okay? And Mr. Raji's guidelines are more than two to
three times that, depending on how you look at it. So I think
that what we're asking for, time served, sounds like it's
nothing, but it's almost a two-or-three-year sentence, given
the fact of already what he's been exposed to on home
incarceration and exposed to in the harsh conditions for at
least 20 months at MDC.

Let's also remember that he's going to be deported, okay? So whatever sentence your Honor gives him and whatever conditions BOP can try to help, regardless of what his conditions are, once he's done, he's being deported. So your Honor, I would ask for you to give a sentence which we ask for, time served. Or if that kind of sounds worse than it is in terms of the Court feels like it sounds too lenient, I would ask you to give him a sentence of 24 months, because I think that would take into consideration the harsh conditions and his medical condition specifically, as well as also Martino-Jean's

sentence and the comparable sentences imposed on people who are similarly situated.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to say anything in connection with the employment record issue or simply rest on that?

MR. SCHNEIDER: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Raji, Mr. Schneider suggested that you might choose not to make a statement, but this is your opportunity. If there is anything you wish to say before I sentence you, this is your opportunity to do so. Do you wish to say anything?

THE DEFENDANT: No, thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, is there any reason why sentence should not be imposed at this time?

MS. KAMAL: No, your Honor.

MR. SCHNEIDER: No.

I did forget one thing — I'm sorry — because you got me sidetracked. You asked me the restitution question when I wasn't ready for it.

I did want to point out one of the reasons Mr. Raji agreed to have the restitution order, even though I told him it may not be a great idea, because what happens if the case gets reversed on appeal? Then he has this restitution order. He acknowledged that he should sign as a way of acknowledging his responsibility. So I wanted that to be included. While he's

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not prepared to accept responsibility on the record, I think his signing of the restitution or his authorizing me to consent to the restitution order is a view towards acceptance of some sort of responsibility, your Honor.

And I'm sorry I interrupted you.

THE COURT: No worries.

In imposing sentence, I'm required to All right. consider the factors set forth in 18, U.S. Code, Section They include, first, the nature and circumstance of 3553(a). the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; second, the need for the sentence imposed to advance the purposes of sentencing, namely, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; third, the kinds of sentences available; fourth, the guidelines range, which I have found to be 108 to 135 months, but 87 to 108 with the benefit of the forthcoming likely amendment; fifth, any pertinent policy statement; sixth, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and, seventh, the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Ultimately, I'm required to impose a sentence that is sufficient, but no

greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing that I mentioned a moment ago.

Now, let me say that in the abstract, in a vacuum, I think a substantial sentence here is certainly warranted. The crimes here are serious ones. We heard testimony from the stand from not one, but three victims of Mr. Raji's crimes, two obviously relevant conduct, but be that as it may, three victims of serious and sophisticated fraud schemes revealing that Mr. Raji was intimately involved over a long period of time in defrauding people of significant sums of money, and also presumably causing them great anxiety and heartache and trying to figure out the vulnerabilities of their information technology systems and other such things.

It is certainly quite concerning. The conduct and the fact that it spanned the amount of time and the number of victims that we know of is itself concerning. Even more concerning is Mr. Raji's apparent willingness to continue that conduct, even after the arrest of Ms. Martino-Jean. And I'm referencing what Ms. Kamal was discussing earlier with respect to the cooperator's approach to Mr. Raji. Bottom line is I think a substantial sentence is certainly warranted for that conduct.

The need for deterrence is high because many people who are involved in these schemes, certainly the collaborators who are presumably not in the United States, are not often or

frequently or likely to be caught, so I think a significant sentence is warranted in the abstract.

Having said that, we're not in the abstract or in a vacuum here, and I think there are reasons, and the government's position on sentencing reflects those reasons, to justify a below-guidelines sentence. One is that conditions of confinement to date — I'm not sure the government acknowledges those, but I have said before and repeat here that the conditions of confinement, most significantly in 2020 when Mr. Raji was in custody at the MCC, but even over the last year that he's been in custody, are harsher conditions than I think pretrial detainees or presentence detainees ought to be enduring. That means a lot of solitary confinement, effective, if not literal.

Back in 2020, being in jail while the pandemic was raging in New York was really not a place that you would want to be, and the conditions were certainly, understandably from the Bureau of Prisons standpoint, but nevertheless from a detainee standpoint, incredibly harsh relative to what conditions should or could be. So I think that is a significant factor, and as I said elsewhere or other judges have said, one day under those conditions is equivalent to something more than one day under other conditions.

Even more significant is Mr. Raji's serious medical conditions, and the government does not dispute them and,

indeed, I think acknowledges that they justify a below-guidelines sentence. I think that is true for two reasons. One is I imagine that conditions of confinement are even more difficult to endure for somebody in Mr. Raji's condition, certainly at the MCC and the MDC. I trust that that is the case even at a designated facility that's more equipped to handle Mr. Raji's conditions. I suspect it's fair to say and is fair to infer that his conditions will make that time more difficult to endure. But second is, just as I do not doubt that the Bureau of Prisons has the capacity to care for Mr. Raji, but there's no question that he will not get as good quality care in custody as he would out.

Now, I think, but for that last reason, I would think the appropriate sentence here would be in the neighborhood of 48 to 60 months. In light of that reason, however, I'm going to impose a lower sentence.

I should say, lastly, I think the sentence imposed on Ms. Martino-Jean does pose an issue here that needs to be considered, which is to say that, to the extent that she's the only other participant in this particular fraud scheme who hasn't cooperated herself, the only other participant who has been convicted and sentenced, the fact that she received a sentence of only six or so months is hard to reconcile with a much more severe sentence on Mr. Raji.

I, as I intimated earlier, absolutely firmly believe

that Mr. Raji was a more significant player, as reflected in the fact that he participated in not one but at least three fraud schemes, as reflected in the fact that he was willing and able to continue to participate in fraud schemes, and given the nature of his role. But be that as it may, that's still a large disparity. I recognize the government has cited several cases involving similar conduct where defendants received substantial sentences, and it's for that reason that I'm not inclined to go as low as Mr. Schneider suggests, but I do think that ensuring that there are no unwarranted disparities is a relevant consideration here as well.

All that said, I will state the sentence that I intend to impose and would ask you, Mr. Raji, if you're able, to please rise at this time.

Mr. Raji, it is the judgment of this Court that you are remanded to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of 36 months, that is three years, on each count to be served concurrently, to be followed by a period of three years of supervised release.

During your term of supervised release, I certainly expect you may be removed from the United States, and in that regard it may be academic. But during your term of supervised release, you will be subject to the mandatory conditions set forth on page 22 of the presentence report, including the fact that you shall satisfy your financial obligations that I will

discuss shortly.

In addition, the standard conditions of supervised release, which are set forth on pages 22 to 24 of the presentence report and will be set forth in the judgment, shall apply. And you must meet the special conditions set forth on page 24, including the search condition, providing the probation officer with access to any requested financial information, not incurring any new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit, and you shall obey the immigration laws and comply with the directives of immigration authorities. And you shall be supervised in the district of your residence.

I do want to make clear that I would have imposed the same sentence, even if the guidelines — the definition of loss included only actual loss. I would disagree with that view of relevant conduct here because I think that somebody who tries to and intends to steal \$1.7 million is more culpable than somebody who steals only 700,000, and to treat someone who fortuitously, because of the intervention of banks or credit cards or whatever the case may be ends up yielding only \$700,000 shouldn't be treated the same as the latter. So for that reason, even if the Third Circuit's view ultimately prevails on that issue, I would impose the same sentence.

I will not impose a fine because I find that Mr. Raji would not be able to pay a fine, and it would likely interfere with his restitution payments. In accordance with the consent

order of restitution, I will order Mr. Raji to pay \$711,557.54 in restitution to the victims set forth in the attached schedule, which will be filed under seal. That is in accordance with the terms of that order, so it is joint and several with Nancy Martino-Jean and Afolabi Adeusi. In addition, I will impose a mandatory special assessment of \$100 per count, for a total \$400, which shall be due and payable immediately. And finally, as reflected in the consent order of forfeiture, I order you, Mr. Raji, to pay forfeiture in the same amount, \$711,557.54 in United States currency in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the order.

Does either counsel know of any legal reason why the sentence that I have stated should not be imposed?

MS. KAMAL: No, your Honor.

Although I do want to clarify the record very briefly after the Court imposes sentence.

MR. SCHNEIDER: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear.

MS. KAMAL: No. I have no objection to the sentence as set forth by the Court, but I do want to correct the record on one point before we adjourn.

THE COURT: Why don't you do that now in case it does matter with respect to the sentence.

MS. KAMAL: I don't think it will affect the sentence, your Honor.

You asked the government whether or not we had contacted all of the victims in advance of sentencing. I know that contact was made with both of the Marble Arch victims. To the extent that the 404(b) victims are not entitled to restitution because the conduct that affected them was uncharged, they were not contacted, to my knowledge and to the knowledge of the other folks at this table. I wanted to make that clear to the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you. I'm not sure they technically qualify as crime victims under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, therefore, I'm not sure they're entitled to notice.

MS. KAMAL: I agree, your Honor. I didn't want to leave a false impression with the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate that.

Mr. Schneider, are you aware of any legal reason why the sentence should not be imposed as stated?

MR. SCHNEIDER: No, sir.

THE COURT: Sentence as stated is imposed.

Mr. Raji, you may be seated if you like.

I find that the sentence is sufficient, but no greater than necessary, to satisfy the sentencing purposes set forth in Section 3553(a)(2), including the need to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence both to Mr. Raji and others, and to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

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Mr. Raji, I certainly hope that, your health issues notwithstanding, that you're able to serve your sentence without serious problem and that you get out. And whenever you get out, wherever you end up - and I suspect it will not be in the United States - I want you, first of all, that if you're removed from the United States, you may not come back to the United States, and if you do and you do so during your term of supervised release, that this is both a violation of supervised release and also a new crime for which you may be punished.

Second, I don't know if your work history is valid or I have my doubts, given the conduct proved at trial, but be that as it may, I hope that the conduct that was on display at trial is something that you put behind you and that you use your talents - and I do not doubt that you have real talents - to good use, to positive use, that you support people like your cousin or niece or whoever it is who you've adopted in some sense of the word, that you do that and support your family in a way that is law abiding and not in a way that you did in connection with trial.

All that is to stay I hope that this conduct does not come to define you, and that you prove to be a better person who does good in the world, not the kind of harm that you did that we saw at trial.

Mr. Schneider, I would assume that you would ask me to recommend a designation to an appropriate medical facility.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes.

THE COURT: Any particular one or any particular geographic area? I assume either Butner or --

MR. SCHNEIDER: Preferably a medical facility near Florida where Mr. Raji was living.

THE COURT: Do you know if there is one? I know Butner is in the Carolinas.

MR. SCHNEIDER: I would suggest Butner in North Carolina, yes, please.

THE COURT: Why don't I specify that I think the most significant matter is an appropriate medical facility or an appropriate facility, given his serious medical conditions, and secondarily, that he would like to be in a location as close to Florida as possible. I'll make that recommendation.

I don't think there are any open counts, unless there is an underlying indictment.

MS. KAMAL: No, your Honor, no open counts.

THE COURT: Mr. Raji, let me say a couple things: I understand that you're preserving your right to appeal, and for that reason are accepting only so much responsibility, but the fact of the matter is I think the evidence at trial was overwhelming of your guilt, and in that regard you do stand in significant contrast to Ms. Martino-Jean, who accepted responsibility for her conduct and didn't put the government through its paces and go to trial.

I hope that you learn a valuable lessen from this, and I hope that when you come out, as I said, that you put yourself to positive and law-abiding purposes, not the purposes that we saw at trial. I assure you that if you don't and if you end up back before me for a violation of supervised release, let alone a new crime, that having given you a significant break on the guidelines that you were facing, that you will not find me so merciful, and I will not necessarily give you the benefit of the doubt with respect to your health or otherwise. So I want you to understand that and understand what's at stake and hopefully put this behind you, but only in a valuable way that involves learning a lesson from it.

You do have the right to appeal your conviction and sentence, and any notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of entry of the judgment of conviction. If you cannot afford to pay the cost of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

Mr. Schneider, you had suggested that you would plan to request permission to withdraw. I'm inclined to think that you can and should raise that with the Court of Appeals to ensure he gets new counsel for the purposes of an appeal. I guess all that is to say I could direct you to file a notice of appeal on his behalf and then make an application to withdraw before the Court of Appeals so they find somebody from the appellate CJA panel who can represent Mr. Raji. Is that okay?

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MR. SCHNEIDER: Understood. And yes, it's absolutely And I'm going to speak to Mr. Raji for a couple of minutes about whether he even wants to file a notice of appeal. But if he does, I will file it on his behalf, one hundred percent. THE COURT: It might be that the prudent thing is to file it, given the issues that you alluded to earlier, your role at trial, to file one if only as a protective measure, and then with new counsel he can discuss with that counsel whether to withdraw the notice. That might be the more prudent course here, but I'll leave that to you to discuss with Mr. Raji. MR. SCHNEIDER: I totally understand, and I appreciate the - I won't say advice because you can't give me advice, but the comment. THE COURT: Admonition, I think. Anything else from the government? MS. KAMAL: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Schneider? MR. SCHNEIDER: No, your Honor. Thank you very much. THE COURT: All right. It is good to bring this

finally to conclusion. And with that, we are adjourned.

Thank you very much.

(Adjourned)

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